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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mark Beavers appeals from his convictions and sentences in two separate 
cases, which have been combined for appeal. In the first case, he appeals his 
conviction and sentences for trafficking in marijuana and possession of marijuana 
with intent to deliver. In the second case, he appeals his conviction and 
sentences for trafficking in marijuana, delivery of marijuana, and possession of 
marijuana with intent to deliver. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Coeur d'Alene Police Department was contacted by the United States 
Drug Enforcement Agency concerning a possible marijuana grow operation in 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. (R., vol. 1, p. 28.) DEA agent Sam Keiser informed 
Detective Eric Paull that he had researched the residence and discovered that 
the owner and occupant of the residence was Mark Beavers. (Id.) The agent 
had also gone to the residence and recognized the odor of marijuana. (Id.) In 
addition, the agent informed Detective Paull that Beavers had not reported any 
income tax in Idaho for the last 5 years. (Id.) 
With this information, Detective Paull initiated an investigation into 
Beavers for the manufacture of marijuana. (Id.) He obtained photographs of 
Beavers' back yard that showed a greenhouse, a Quonset hut, and a garden 
area. Because he did not know the age of the photographs, he also flew over the 
residence and viewed the greenhouse, the garden area, and a water tank. (Id.) 
Detective Paull contacted one of Beavers' neighbors who told the detective that 
1 
there was a rumor that Beavers was a marijuana dealer and that his neighbors 
had smelled marijuana in the air. (R., vol. I, p. 29.) The neighbor also said that 
Beavers kept very strange hours and was extremely private about what he did in 
his backyard. (Id.) 
Another neighbor reported a "skunky" smell coming from Beavers' 
property. (R., vol. I, p. 26.) Upon investigation, Detective Paull recognized the 
odor of growing marijuana coming from the area of Beavers' backyard/house. 
(Id.) With this information, Detective Paull obtained a search warrant for the 
property. (R. vol. I., p. 32.) 
On August 13, 2006, Detective Paull executed the search warrant. (Tr., 
vol. I, p. 463, Ls. 9-18. 1) He discovered and seized 44 marijuana plants that 
were growing both in the house and in two greenhouses on the property. (Tr., 
vol. I, p. 491, L. 23 - p. 492, L. 1.) He also seized 25.5 pounds of marijuana from 
the residence (Tr., vol. I, p. 668, Ls. 5-14) that was located in various quantities 
and in different rooms throughout the residence. (See generally, Tr., vol. I, p. 
464, L. 16 - p. 565, L. 7). The detective also seized baggies and numerous 
canning jars, some of which contained marijuana and labels that read: "Brought 
to you by the bud shop, where quality is No. 1." (Tr., vol. I, p. 467, L. 2 - p. 468, 
L. 23.) In addition, he seized two digital scales (Tr., vol. I, p. 468, L. 24 - p. 
1 There are a number of transcripts contained in the Record on Appeal. The 
longest one, which includes the June 16-19, 2008 trial in the First Case and the 
January 30, 2009 joint sentencing hearing, will be referred to as "Tr., vol. I;" the 
transcript of the proceedings of the first day of the second trial and the 
proceedings on October 28, 2008, will be referred to as "Tr., vol. II;" and the 
transcript of the second and third days of the trial in the Second Case, will be 
referred to as "Tr., vol. Ill." 
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469, L. 12) and grow ballasts (Tr., vol. I, p. 479, L. 23 - p. 480, L. 3). Detective 
Paull also seized hash located in a cooler (Tr., vol. I, p. 475, Ls. 1-4). He 
discovered numerous magazines and books about growing and selling marijuana 
(Tr., vol. I, p. 519, Ls. 7-18; R., vol. I, p. 30), and records showing detailed 
recipes for hash and information on different varieties of marijuana, including 
harvesting and tasting information (Tr., vol. I, p. 545, L. 7 - p. 549, L. 22; p. 554, 
L. 21 - p. 556, L. 8). 
Beavers was arrested and was charged with trafficking in marijuana for 
possessing 25 pounds or more of marijuana, trafficking in marijuana for 
possessing 25 or more marijuana plants, and possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver (hereinafter, the "First Case"). (R., vol. I, pp. 66-
67.) On October 19, 2006, Beavers pied not guilty to the charges (R., vol. I, p. 
77-80), and was released from jail while his case was pending (R., vol. I, p. 79). 
After extensive pre-trial proceedings, his case finally proceeded to trial on June 
16, 2008. At trial and over the state's objection, Beavers presented and argued 
his marijuana necessity defense. (See generally, Tr., vol. I, p. 779, L. 15 - p. 
787, L. 10; p. 789, L. 10- p. 860, L. 17.) However, despite permitting Beavers to 
argue his defense to the jury, the district court refused Beavers' proffered jury 
instruction and held that Beavers had failed to present reasonable evidence on 
one of the elements of the necessity defense. (Tr., vol. I, p. 893, L. 11 - p. 895, 
L. 9.) The jury acquitted Beavers of trafficking in marijuana, more than 25 
pounds, but convicted him of trafficking in marijuana, more than 5 but less than 
3 
25 pounds, and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. (R., vol. 111, pp. 
562-64.) 
Meanwhile, while Beavers' First Case was pending, Beavers was charged 
with delivery of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and 
trafficking in marijuana (hereinafter, the "Second Case"). (R., vol. 11, pp. 327-
330.) These new charges stemmed from a confidential informant's purchase of 
marijuana from Beavers on November 21, 2007. The confidential informant had 
previously met Beavers at a medical marijuana clinic in Washington and had 
seen him occasionally outside of the clinic. (Tr., vol. 111, p. 10, L. 2 - p. 11, L. 9.) 
Beavers told the confidential informant that he could supply marijuana and 
marijuana plant starts to medical marijuana patients. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 12, L. 3 - p. 
13, L. 2.) 
Eventually, the confidential informant contacted the Coeur d'Alene police 
department and the police department set up a controlled buy from Beavers with 
the confidential informant's help. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 16, L. 13 - p. 19, L. 19.) The 
confidential informant called Beavers and told him that she had a friend who was 
interested in purchasing marijuana from Beavers. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 17, Ls. 10-19.) 
The confidential informant, her friend (an undercover police officer) and Beavers 
met at a Starbucks coffee shop. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 17, Ls. 23-25.) After talking for 
approximately 20 minutes, Beavers went out to his vehicle, opened the trunk, 
and sold the undercover officer an ounce of marijuana. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 18, L. 12 -
p. 19, L. 19; p. 44, L. 18 - p. 45, L. 12.) When the undercover officer purchased 
the marijuana, she noticed multiple baggies of marijuana in Beavers' suitcase in 
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his trunk. (Tr., vol. 111, p. 52, L. 24 - p. 53, L. 12.) After selling the marijuana to 
the undercover police officer, Beavers was.arrested. (Tr., vol. 11, p. 134, L. 10 -
p. 135, L. 3.) 
After Beavers was arrested, Detective Paull obtained a search warrant for 
Beavers' residence. (Tr., vol. 11, p. 138, L. 16- p. 139, L. 5.) Upon executing the 
search warrant, Detective Paull discovered 30 marijuana plants in Beavers' 
greenhouses, and related growing paraphernalia, including lights, climate control 
heaters, fans and electric timers. (Tr., vol. II, p. 141, L. 7 - p. 142, L. 7.) In 
addition, the detective discovered 49 marijuana plant starts in the residence. 
(Tr., vol. II, p. 143, Ls. 1-5.) He also seized numerous baggies, a digital scale, 
and literature in the residence. (Tr., vol. II, p. 160, L. 8- p. 162, L. 2.) 
Beavers was charged with delivery of marijuana, possession of marijuana 
with intent to deliver and trafficking in marijuana. (R., vol. II, pp. 327-30.) In 
addition, in Parts II, 111, and IV of the information, the state alleged several drug 
enhancements.2 After lengthy pre-trial proceedings, Beavers' trial in the Second 
Case commenced on October 28, 2008. {Tr., vol. II, p. 4.) At trial and after the 
state had rested, Beavers made an offer of proof to show that his use of 
marijuana was medically necessary and that he should be permitted to present 
his necessity defense to the jury. (See generally, Tr., vol. Ill, p. 67, L. 13 - p. 
120, L. 1.) After hearing Beavers' testimony, the district court concluded that 
there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would support giving an 
2 The state also alleged that Beavers was a persistent violator in Part V of the 
Information but later withdrew that allegation. (R., vol. II, p. 329; Tr., vol. Ill, p. 
232, Ls. 14-18.) 
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instruction on the common law defense of necessity and, therefore, Beavers 
could not present his necessity defense to the jury. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 132, Ls. 19-
21.) 
Subsequently, the jury convicted Beavers of all three offenses. (R., vol. 
Ill, pp. 655-56.) Thereafter, Beavers waived his right to a jury trial on Parts 11, Ill, 
and IV of the amended information and conditionally admitted the enhancements, 
reseNing his right to argue that the verdicts in the First Case could not be used 
to enhance his sentences in the Second Case. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 222, L. 10 - p. 
232, L. 13.) 
The First Case and the Second Case were consolidated for sentencing on 
January 30, 2009. (R., vol. Ill, p. 680.) Prior to sentencing, both the state and 
the defense submitted sentencing memorandums explaining their views of how 
the various enhancements applied to the offenses. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 661-71.) 
During the first phase of the sentencing hearing, the district court discussed the 
statutory sentencing scheme, including the minimum and maximum sentences 
for each offense and how each enhancement could apply. (See generally, Tr., 
vol. I, p. 997, L. 3-p. 1025, L. 11.) During the second phase of the hearing, the 
district court made corrections to the PSI, heard Beavers' lengthy af\ocution, and 
listened to argument from the state and defense. (See generally, Tr., vol. I, p. 
1025, L. 12 - p. 1062, L. 7.) Ultimately, the district court sentenced Beavers as 
follows: 
6 
CR2006-18813 [First Case]: 
Count 1: Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(1)(B) Trafficking in 
Marijuana of five (5) pounds or more, but less than twenty-five (25) 
pounds, 
for a total unified sentence not to exceed six (6) years, 
commencing with a fixed period of three (3) years, to be followed by 
an additional three (3) year indeterminate sentence, and a fine of 
$10,000.00 (ten thousand) dollars. 
Count 2: Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1)(8) Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver, Marijuana 
for a total unified sentence not to exceed five (5) years, 
commencing with a fixed period of one ( 1) year, to be followed by a 
an additional four (4) year indeterminate sentence 
The sentences on each count in case CR2006-18813 shall 
run concurrent. 
CR2007-27416 [Second Case]: 
Count 1: Idaho Code § 37-2732(a)(1 )(8) Delivery of a 
Controlled Substance, Marijuana 
for a total unified sentence not to exceed five (5) years, 
commencing with a fixed period of two (2) years, to be followed by 
an additional three (3) year indeterminate sentence. 
Count 2: Idaho Code§ 37-2732(a)(1)(8) Possession of 
a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver, Marijuana 
for a total unified sentence not to exceed five (5) years, 
commencing with a fixed period of two (2)years, to be followed by 
an additional three (3) year indeterminate sentence. 
Count 3: Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(1)(A) Trafficking in 
Marijuana of up to twenty-five (25) plants, 
and defendant having waived a jury trial and having admitted 
to the entry of a jury verdict of guilty in the Trafficking in Marijuana 
in Count 1 in CR2006-18813, which jury verdict of guilty the court 
finds to constitute a prior trafficking offense for purposes of 
establishing a mandatory minimum fixed term pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 37-2732(B)(a)(7) for a second conviction; 
for a total unified sentence to not exceed twelve (12) years, 
commencing with a fixed period of two (2) years, to be followed by 
an additional indeterminate period of ten (10) years, and a fine of 
$5,000.00 (five thousand) dollars. 
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The sentences imposed in the above counts in CR2007-
27416 shall run concurrent with each other. The sentences 
imposed in CR2007-27416 shall run concurrent with the sentences 
imposed in CR2006-18813. 
(R., vol. 111, pp. 681-82; see also Tr., vol. I, p. 1072, L. 5 - p. 1073, L. 10.) In 
sum, Beavers was sentenced to twelve years with three years fixed. (Id.) 
Beavers appealed. (R., vol. Ill, p. 689-91.) The state cross-appealed on 
the grounds that Beavers' sentence was illegal, and filed a Rule 35 motion 
asserting that his sentence was illegal because the district court failed to apply 
one of the sentencing enhancements that Beavers had admitted. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 
693-96, 697-99.) The district court denied the state's motion. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 
706-15.) 
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ISSUES ON DIRECT APPEAL 
Beavers states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' First Case by 
refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity? 
2. Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' Second Case by 
refusing to allow Mr. Beavers to present evidence in support of his 
proffered necessity defense, and by refusing to instruct the jury on 
that defense? 
3. Did the district court err at Mr. Beavers' joint sentencing 
hearing by enhancing Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case 
based on its finding that he had been previously convicted of 
certain drug offenses in the First Case? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 20.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. In the First Case, has Beavers failed to show that the district court erred in 
refusing his jury instruction? 
2. In the Second Case, has Beavers failed to show that the district court 
erred in refusing to allow Beavers to present evidence in support of his proffered 
necessity defense, and by refusing to instruct the jury on that defense? 
3. Has Beavers failed to show that the district court erred at Beavers' joint 
sentencing hearing by enhancing Beavers' sentences in the Second Case based 
on its findings that Beavers had been previously convicted of certain offenses in 
the First Case? 
ISSUE ON CROSS APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err when, after withdrawing Beavers' admission to a 
sentencing enhancement, it failed to reinstate the parties to the status quo prior 
to the admission having been made? 
9 
ARGUMENT ON DIRECT APPEAL 
I. 
Beavers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Refusing His Jury 
Instruction 
A. Introduction 
Beavers claims error in the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that, 
"even if it found that Mr. Beavers possessed marijuana, it could find him not guilty 
on the basis of the common law defense of necessity based on the fact that his 
use of marijuana was necessary to treat his medical condition." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 21.) Beavers' argument is without merit for several reasons. First, the 
district court, as a matter of law, could not instruct the jury on the necessity 
defense. Second, even if the district court could instruct the jury on the necessity 
defense, Beavers' presented no credible evidence of a specific immediate harm, 
or that that same objective (improved health) could not have been accomplished 
by a less offensive alternative. Beavers also failed to present any evidence that 
there was a causal relationship between his use of marijuana and his purported 
improved health. 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 
P.2d 691, 694 (1992); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. 
App. 2000). To be reversible error, any error in the jury instructions must have 
misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 
10 
970,977, 188 P.3d 912,919 (2008); State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303,310,955 P.2d 
1082, 1089 (1998). 
C. "Necessity" Can Not Be A Viable Justification For The Crimes Of 
Trafficking Or Possession With Intent To Deliver 
Beavers argues that the district court erred in refusing his proposed 
instruction regarding his "necessity defense." (Appellant's brief, pp 21-28.) 
However, because medical necessity, even if established, is not a defense to the 
crimes of trafficking or possession with intent to deliver, Beavers' argument must 
fail. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2132(a) addresses jury instructions and states that 
in "charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for 
their information. Either party may present to the court any written charge and 
request that it be given. If the court thinks it correct and pertinent, it must be 
given; if not it must be refused." A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction 
that is an erroneous statement of the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an 
impermissible comment on the evidence or is adequately covered by other 
instructions. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987). 
"In order to determine whether the defendant's proposed instruction should have 
been given, this Court must examine the instructions that were given and the 
evidence that was adduced at trial." J.g_,_ at 881, 736 P.2d at 1335. To be 
reversible error, any error in the jury instructions must have misled the jury or 
prejudiced the complaining party. Row, 131 Idaho at 310, 955 P .2d at 1089. 
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When a defendant requests an instruction, I.C. § 19-2132 has been 
interpreted as requiring a two-prong analysis. State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 
90, 831 P.2d 555, 558 (1992). First, the trial court must determine if the theory 
presented in the instruction applies to the case. j_g_,_ Second, the trial court must 
then determine if the instruction is a correct statement of the law. j_g_,_ If the 
theory is not supported by the evidence, then the court must reject the 
instruction. j_g_,_ But if the theory is supported by the evidence, then the court 
must determine if the instruction is a correct statement of law. j_g_,_ If it is a correct 
statement of the law, then the instruction should be given. j_g_,_ If the instruction is 
an incorrect statement of the law, then the trial court is under an affirmative duty 
to properly instruct the jury. J__g__,_ at 91, 831 P.2d at 559. 
The Idaho Supreme Court discussed the elements of the common law 
defense of necessity in State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854,801 P.2d 563 (1990). 
The basic premise behind the necessity defense is that a person who is forced to 
commit an illegal offense in order to prevent a greater harm should not be 
punished for such illegal act. Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. The 
court reiterated the elements of the defense of necessity: (1) a specific threat of 
immediate harm; (2) the circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not 
have been brought about by the defendant; (3) the same objective could not 
have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to the actor; 
and (4) the harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided. j_g_,_; see 
also State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2001); ICJI No. 
1512. 
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As an initial matter, the defense of necessity is clearly inapplicable to the 
crime of possession with intent to deliver and Beavers does not argue otherwise. 
In State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1D96 (Ct. App. 20D1), the court of 
appeal held that medical necessity could not be a viable justification for 
possession with intent to deliver because the defendant's own medical need for 
marijuana could not justify her possession of the drug with the intent to deliver it 
to others. 
Likewise, for these same reasons, necessity is not a viable justification for 
trafficking. In 1992, the Idaho State Legislature adopted the crime of trafficking 
and made it a crime separate and distinct from simple possession. Trafficking 
applies to the possession of marijuana in the amount of 1 pound or more. I.C. § 
37-2732B(a)(1 ). The legislature has effectively determined that possession of a 
large amount of marijuana cannot be for personal use and has enhanced the 
penalties for trafficking accordingly. Due to the sheer volume of marijuana that 
must be possessed to be convicted of trafficking, the defense of necessity cannot 
apply - an individual cannot "need" to possess one pound or more of marijuana. 
Necessity can not be a viable justification for possession of such large quantities 
of a controlled substance, especially when that substance is illegal to obtain in 
any amount. 
D. The Legislature Has Determined That Marijuana Has No Medically 
Accepted Use And. Therefore. The District Court Did Not Err In Refusing 
To Give Beavers' Proffered Necessity Defense Jury Instruction 
Application of a necessity defense would also be contrary to legislative 
intent. The Idaho State Legislature has determined that marijuana has no 
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medically accepted use and, therefore, the district court could not instruct the jury 
regarding Beavers' allegedly medically necessary use of marijuana. The Idaho 
State Legislature adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") in 
1971. In the CSA, the legislature chose to classify marijuana as a Schedule I 
controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(19). The only substances included in 
Schedule I are substances that (1) have a high potential for abuse, and (2) have 
"no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States" or lack accepted 
safety for use in treatment under medical supervision. I.C. § 37-2704. In 
classifying marijuana as a Schedule I substance, the legislature determined that 
marijuana has no medical benefits.3 Had the legislature chosen to do so, 
marijuana could have been classified in a different schedule or been de-classified 
entirely.4 
Because the legislature has already determined that marijuana has no 
accepted medical use, the defense of necessity can not apply. The United State 
Supreme Court explained in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' 
Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001 ): 
Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is 
clear: The defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has 
made a "determination of values." In the case of the Controlled 
Substances Act, the statute reflects a determination that marijuana 
3 Notably, cocaine and opium are Schedule II substances that, although they 
have a high potential for abuse and abuse of the substance may lead to severe 
physical or physical dependence, have "currently accepted medical use in 
treatment in the United States, or currently accepted medical use with severe 
restrictions." I.C. § 32-2706. 
4 The Idaho State Legislature adopted the CSA in 1971 and classified marijuana 
as a Schedule I controlled substance at that time. The State Board of Pharmacy 
now maintains the authority to reclassify controlled substances pursuant to the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. I.C. § 37-3702. 
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has no medical benefits worthy of an exception (outside the 
confines of a Government-approved research project). Whereas 
some other drugs can be dispensed and prescribed for medical 
use, see 21 U.S.C. § 829, the same is not true for marijuana. 
Indeed, for purposes of the Controlled Substances act, marijuana 
has "no currently accepted medical use" at all. 
(internal citations omitted). 
Indeed, the structure of the CSA supports this conclusion. Controlled 
substances are divided into 6 schedules, depending, in part, on whether the drug 
has a currently accepted medical use in treatment. See generally I.C. §§ 37-
2704 - 2714. Drugs can only be placed on Schedule I if they have "no currently 
accepted medical use." Accordingly, by placing marijuana on Schedule I, the 
legislation has determined that marijuana does not have any accepted medical 
use. Further, the Board of Pharmacy has been instructed to revise the schedules 
annually. I.C. § 37-2714. If the Board of Pharmacy, pursuant to legislative 
delegation, determined that marijuana had "any accepted medical use" then 
marijuana could not remain classified as a Schedule I substance. The bard has 
not changed marijuana's classification by the legislature as having no medicinal 
use. 
It can not be medically "necessary" to possess something which the 
legislature has determined has "no currently accepted medical use." For this 
reason, the district court did not err in refusing to give Beavers' proffered jury 
instruction concerning his necessity defense. 
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E. Beavers' Failed To Present Credible Evidence Supporting Two Elements 
Of The Necessity Defense 
Even if this court were to determine that the defense of necessity can 
apply to the crime of trafficking marijuana, a review of the law and the record 
shows that Beavers' necessity defense was not supported by any reasonable 
view of the evidence. See State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 392, 924 P.2d 1230, 
1236 (Ct. App. 1996). To be entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense, 
a defendant must "present facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case 
relevant to [the] defense." State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657, 
660-61 (Ct. App. 2000). To show a prima facie defense of necessity the 
defendant must present evidence of (1) a specific threat of immediate harm; (2) 
the circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not have been brought 
about by the defendant; (3) the same objective could not have been 
accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to the actor; and (4) the 
harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided. Hastings, 118 Idaho 
at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. To prevail on appeal, Beavers must show that there is a 
reasonable view of the evidence presented that would support his theory of 
necessity. 
1. Beavers Failed To Present Credible Evidence Showing A Specific 
Threat Of An Immediate Harm - The First Element Of The 
Necessity Defense 
Beavers has failed present evidence of a specific threat of immediate 
harm, the first element of the necessity defense. Beavers testified that his health 
began to fail in 1996 and he began using marijuana medicinally, as opposed to 
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recreationally, at that time. (Tr., vol. I, p. 799, L. 5 - p. 800, L. 11.) Beavers 
asserts that "surely, abdominal pain, coupled with ongoing rectal bleeding and 
severe headaches, all of which cases the sufferer to be completely incapacitated, 
is a 'threat of immediate harm' within the meaning of Hastings." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 25.) However, Beavers testified that these were his symptoms at the 
outset of his health problems in 1996 but that his health improved over time. (Tr., 
vol. I, p. 853, Ls. 5-13.) Thus, Beavers has failed to show "immediacy." At trial, 
the following colloquy between Beavers and his attorney occurred: 
Q: Did [your condition] improve sufficiently that you had less 
concern as to whether you were gravely ill or manageably ill? 
A: Well, as time progressed my condition continued to improve, 
and so I felt that I was doing a reasonably good job at managing it. 
And I still wasn't making a lot of money, so I wasn't extending 
myself financially in any way, I mean -
Q: Did - at that point, when your condition had improved 
significantly, did you feel that you needed to have traditional 
medical treatment? 
A: Well, everything becomes a financial choice. I mean, the 
things that the prosecutor has referred to, I had several boats. 
These are old wood boats I bought to do a project. Woodworking 
and refinishing are things I do. These are not expensive drug-dollar 
boats where I was putting lots of marijuana into hidden assets. 
These were old boats to repair. 
Q: Again, I guess I was asking once your medical condition in 
your mind had improved through your change of regimen, at that 
time did you think that you were in dire need of traditional 
medicine? 
A: No. My condition was improving. And so I had become 
fairly convinced that what I had worked out, that my own self 
diagnosis had been reasonably accurate and the steps that I had 
taken to manage my condition were working. So I didn't feel 
incredibly motivated to start spending money and going and seeing 
doctors at that point. 
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(Tr., vol. I, p. 855, L. 5 - p. 856, L. 7.) Even assuming, arguendo, that in 1996 
Beavers' health problems constituted a "specific threat of immediate harm," 
Beavers admits that by 2006 (when he was arrested) his health problems were 
largely under control and so he "didn't feel incredibly motivated to start spending 
money and seeing doctors at that point." Beavers did not present evidence of a 
"specific threat of an immediate harm." 
Because Beavers failed to present evidence of an immediate harm, the 
district court did not err in refusing to give Beavers' proffered necessity jury 
instruction. 
2. Beavers Has Failed To Present Evidence Showing That The Same 
Objective Could Not Have Been Accomplished By A Less Offensive 
Alternative - The Third Element Of The Necessity Defense 
The third element of the necessity defense required Beaver to "present 
evidence showing that the same objective could not have been accomplished by 
a less offensive alternative." Although Beavers asserts that his burden was only 
to produce evidence on this point, and not to persuade the trier of fact 
(Appellant's brief, p. 26), he is only entitled to his instruction if "there is a 
reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that would support his 
theory." Eastman, 122 Idaho at 90, 831 P.2d at 558. Beavers failed to present 
reasonable evidence of the third element of the necessity defense for two 
reasons: (1) he failed to present evidence that the amount of marijuana that he 
possessed was necessary and that his recovery could not have been 
accomplished with a smaller amount; and (2) he failed to present reasonable 
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evidence that he could have accomplished the same result through conventional 
medicine. 
Beavers was charged with trafficking in marijuana, more than twenty-five 
pounds, and was convicted of trafficking in marijuana, between five and twenty-
five pounds. (R., vol. I, pp. 66-67; R., vol. 111, p. 563.) The record is devoid of 
any reasonable explanation as to why Beavers needed to possess marijuana in 
such large quantities and why a smaller amount would not be sufficient to 
adequately address his medical needs. The only possible explanation that 
Beavers gave is that he possessed the marijuana in such a great quantity 
because he was preparing to move to Washington. (Tr., vol. I, p. 824, Ls. 13-22; 
p. 826, Ls. 10-19.) 
The district court determined that there was insufficient evidence to 
support element 3 of the necessity defense - that the same objective could not 
have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to the actor: 
Well, the Court has determined not to give the necessity 
defense instruction here. With regard to the elements of the 
defense, the - I think the Court - it was not specifically stated, but 
the test is an objective standard. In other words, the subjective 
testimony of the defendant would be insufficient to establish the, in 
and of itself, would be insufficient to establish as a matter of law 
that the evidence in the record supported the giving of a defense. I 
would agree that in State v. Hasting there is nothing there to 
indicate that the medical necessity defense would not be 
admissible, not only with regard to a possession charge but with 
regard to a trafficking charge. 
However, in this case the Court is concluding that certainly 
with regard to the trafficking charge there is no - under no objective 
standard is there any evidence here that would indicate that the 
amounts involved were necessary in order to treat the condition. 
So the Court is pretty comfortable with an absolute absence of 
evidence with regard to that element on the trafficking charge. 
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With regard to the lesser included of simple possession of 
marijuana, should the jury get to that, the question is a closer one 
because of the State versus Hastings case, but again because of 
the uncontroverted evidence with regard to the amounts here and 
the lack of evidence with regard - other than the subjective 
testimony of the defendant himself which of course is certainly 
pertinent and relevant on a mens rea element of why he is 
possessing the substances, doesn't establish, in the court's view, 
sufficiency of evidence to meet the elements of the defense, either 
the specific threat of immediate harm or that the same objective 
could not be accomplished by significantly smaller amounts, or, for 
that matter, some other alternative method that is available. 
So the Court's ruling even on the lesser included of the 
possession charge, should the jury get to that, while State versus 
Hastings certainly indicates that the necessity defense is not barred 
as a matter of law, that has not been the ruling by this Court. The 
Court has ruled specifically over the state's objection that the 
necessity defense was available. It is the Court's view that the 
proof in this case is insufficient as a matter of law to justify granting 
- giving the instruction of common law necessity defense, even 
with regard to the lesser of the simple possession of marijuana, and 
certainly it does not apply to the trafficking charge. 
(Tr., vol. I, p. 893, L. 11 - p. 895, L. 6.) Beavers has failed to show on the record 
how this analysis of the requirement that he show that the same objective could 
not otherwise be accomplished is erroneous. 
No reasonable view of the evidence leads to the conclusion that Beavers 
could not have achieved his objective in personal medical marijuana use without 
engaging in trafficking. Review of state laws legalizing this objective is 
instructive. For example, in Washington, a qualified individual may only possess 
a sixty-day supply of marijuana, which is defined as that amount of marijuana 
that a qualifying patient would reasonably be expected to need over a period of 
sixty days for their personal medical use. Wash. Rev. Code § 69-51A.080. In 
Oregon, an individual with a medical marijuana card may possess no more than 
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6 mature marijuana plants and 24 ounces of usable marijuana. Or. Rev. Stat. § 
475.320. In Colorado, an individual with a medical marijuana card may possess 
no more than 2 ounces of a usable form of marijuana and no more than six 
marijuana plants, with three or fewer being mature, flowering plants that are 
producing a usable form of marijuana. In California, the law that limited 
possession to no more than eight ounces of dried marijuana per qualified patient 
and no more than six mature or 12 immature marijuana plants per qualified 
patient may be unconstitutional and will likely be replaced with a "reasonableness 
requirement." Cal. Health & Safety Code§ 11362.77; People v. Phomphakdy, 81 
Cal. RpTr. 3d 443, 450 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2008) (review granted); People v. 
Kelly, 77 Cal. RpTr. 3d 390 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2008) (review granted). 
Each of these states determined the amount of marijuana that it deemed 
reasonable under its medical marijuana act. Beavers' possession of marijuana 
for his "medical use" greatly exceeds even the most liberal standard discussed 
above. Beavers admitted to possessing 45 marijuana plants and the state's 
witness testified that he also possessed 25.5 pounds of loose, dried marijuana. 
(Tr., vol. I, p. 847, Ls. 8-10; p. 668, Ls. 5-14.) Beavers testified that he was 
consuming between a quarter ounce and a half ounce per day. (Tr., vol. I, p. 
826, Ls. 3-5.) Even assuming that he only possessed 5 pounds (he was 
convicted of trafficking in marijuana, 5 pounds or more but less than 25 pounds), 
and the high end of his daily use of one half ounce per day, Beavers had a 160 
day current supply with a crop to supply much, much more. Under no 
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reasonable view does Beavers' possession of 45 marijuana plants and 
approximately 25 pounds of marijuana qualify as "personal use." 
In addition, Beavers failed to present any reasonable evidence that the 
same objective could have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative by 
engaging in conventional medicine. Although Beavers asserted that originally he 
could not afford a doctor, he later conceded that by 2005 he was feeling better 
and working more but still chose not to go to a doctor. (Tr., vol. I, p. 853, L. 2 -
p. 855, L. 4.) He testified that he purchased a home and continued to make his 
mortgage payments on it throughout his illness, that he made improvements to 
his home, acquired several boats and vehicles, purchased land in Washington, 
and made improvements to the land in Washington. (Tr., vol. I, p. 827, L. 19 - p. 
834, L. 2.) He admitted that "everything just becomes a financial choice" and 
that when he began to feel better he just "didn't feel incredibly motivated to start 
spending money and seeing doctors at that point." (Tr., vol. I, p. 855, L. 16 - p. 
856, L. 7 .) Beavers failed to present evidence that he had no alternative but to 
illegally traffic in marijuana to treat his medical issues. 
F. Beavers Presented Failed To Present A Causal Relationship Between His 
Use Of Marijuana And His Allegedly Improved Health Conditions 
Finally, although not specifically articulated as a separate element of the 
necessity defense in Hastings, there is undoubtedly a requirement that there be 
causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the harm to be averted. 
See United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 433 (9th Cir .. 1985). Certainly when the Hastings court is 
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talking about "circumstances which necessitated the illegal act" and the 
"objective" of the act being "accomplished" it is incorporating causation. 
Hastings, 118 Idaho at 855, 801 P.2d at 564. The "basic premise" behind the 
necessity defense is that a person is "compelled to commit an illegal act in order 
to prevent a greater harm." )Q_,_ (emphasis added). 
Beavers presented no nexus between his use of marijuana and his 
allegedly improved health and therefore offered no evidence that his marijuana 
trafficking prevented a "greater harm." There was no medical testimony that his 
use of marijuana actually improved his symptoms. The record is devoid of any 
expert witnesses, doctor's reports, or clinical research trials that would support 
his claim that marijuana improved his medical condition. Beavers' symptoms 
could have improved from any number of reasons - his improved organic diet, 
exercise, or even just time. Beavers testified that marijuana made him feel better 
- that eating it and smoking it relaxed him: "I tend to be an anxious person, and 
so for me smoking buds would be what I would guess I would a kind of a mood 
stabilizer. I mean, I could relax and be calm and feel a feeling of elation, a 
feeling of well-being." (Tr., vol. I, p. 806, Ls. 4-13; p. 807, Ls. 12-18.) 
Undoubtedly, marijuana made him feel better, at least temporarily, which is the 
exact reason why people smoke and ingest it. However, Beavers has provided 
no correlation between his medical condition and his trafficking in marijuana, 
other than his self-diagnosed "I feel better when I use it." Thus, there was no 
causal connection between the conduct and the harm, and the district court 
therefore properly refused Beavers' jury instruction. 
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11. 
Beavers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In His Second 
Case By Refusing To Let Him Present Evidence In Support Of His Proffered 
Necessity Defense And Refusing To Instruct The Jury On That Defense 
A. Introduction 
In the Second Case, Beavers was convicted of delivery, possession of 
marijuana with intent to deliver, and trafficking in marijuana. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 655-
56.) On appeal, Beavers asserts that the district court erred in the Second Case 
by denying him the opportunity to present evidence concerning his purported 
medical need for marijuana and refusing to instruct the jury of his necessity 
defense. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-29.) Beavers argument, however, is without 
merit. 
B. Standard of Review 
Whether proffered evidence is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of 
an affirmative defense is reviewed de novo. State v. Chisholm, 126 Idaho 319, 
883 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Correctly Refused To Pennit Beavers To Present 
Evidence In Support Of His Proffered Necessity Defense And Correctly 
Refused To Instruct The Jury On That Defense 
Proposed evidence is irrelevant if it is offered only to prove an affirmative 
defense which is shown to be inadequate as a matter of law. Chisholm, 126 
Idaho at 321, 882 P.2d at 976. When the offered evidence, even if it is believed 
by a jury, would not make a prima facie showing of one element of an affirmative 
defense, there is no right to present that defense at trial. kl The United States 
Supreme Court explained in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,416 (1980): 
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The requirement of a threshold showing on the part of those who 
assert an affirmative defense to a crime is by no means a 
derogation of the importance of the jury as a judge of credibility. 
Nor is it based on any distrust of the jury's ability to separate fact 
from fiction. On the contrary, it is a testament to the importance of 
trial by jury and the need to husband the resources necessary for 
that process by limiting evidence in a trial to that directed at the 
elements of the crime or at affirmative defenses. If, as, we here 
hold, an affirmative defense consists of several elements and 
testimony supporting one element is insufficient to sustain it even if 
believed, the trial court and jury need not be burdened with 
testimony supporting other elements of the defense. 
Accordingly, if the evidence presented in a defendant's offer of proof, even if 
believed by the jury, would not support one or more elements of the necessity 
defense, the evidence was properly excluded. Chisholm, 126 Idaho at 321, 882 
P.2d at 976. Here, Beavers failed to present evidence that supported elements 
of his necessity defense. 
1. Beavers Failed To Present Evidence In His Offer Of Proof Of A 
Specific Threat Of Immediate Harm 
Beavers failed to present evidence in his offer of proof of a specific threat 
of immediate harm. It is not enough for him to simply assert that he felt bad and 
marijuana made him feel better. Beavers testified that initially, around 1996, his 
symptoms were painful and debilitating but that they had lessened by 2006, and 
that he believed that his improved health was from the use of marijuana. (See 
generally Tr., vol. Ill, p. 67, L. 12 - p. 120, L. 1.) Further, in the time between his 
first arrest and his second arrest, Beavers visited a physician who prescribed him 
conventional prescriptions for high blood pressure and irritable bowel syndrome. 
(Tr., vol. 111, p. 76, Ls. 5-17; p. 85, Ls. 17-22.) Within several weeks he ceased 
taking the drug prescribed for his irritable bowel syndrome because, although it 
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was working, he began experience side effects and, rather than returning to his 
physician, he simply began using marijuana again. (Tr., vol. Ill, 77, L. 3 - 79, L. 
6.) 
That Beavers' irritable bowel syndrome was not a threat of immediate 
harm that could only be remedied by his use of marijuana is highlighted by the 
fact that when faced with a true emergency - painful kidney stones - Beavers 
went to the emergency room and received oonventional medical treatment. (Tr., 
vol. Ill, p. 112, L. 18 - p. 113, L. 12.) It is further highlighted by the fact that in 
1989 he purchased a home, continued to pay his mortgage on his house from 
1996 through 2006, made improvements to the house, purchased two vehicles, 
purchased two boats, and bought materials with which to grow marijuana, 
including grow lights, books, DVDs, and seeds. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 100, L. 19 - p. 
105, L. 5.) Had Beavers' medical condition actually constituted a "specific 
immediate harm," he clearly had the funds to visit a regular physician for his 
health concerns. Beavers simply chose to use marijuana instead. Beavers failed 
to present reasonable evidence of a specific immediate harm. The district court 
did not err in refusing to permit Beavers to present his necessity defense to the 
jury or in refusing to give Beavers' proffered jury instruction. 
2. Beavers Failed To Present Evidence In His Offer Of Proof That The 
Same Objective Could Have Been Accomplished By A Less 
Offensive Alternative 
Beavers failed to present evidence in his offer of proof that the same 
objective could have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative. As 
discussed in 11.C.1 above, Beavers had the funds to obtain conventional medical 
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treatment, he simply chose not to do so because of his preference for marijuana. 
Conventional medical treatment is clearly a less offensive alternative to his use of 
marijuana. 
At his second trial, Beavers again testified that he had purchased a home 
and remodeled it and that he had purchased several vehicles and boats. (Tr., 
vol. Ill, p. 100, L. 19 - p. 104, L. 2.) He also admitted to purchasing the 
equipment and materials necessary to start his new grow operation. (Tr., vol. Ill, 
p. 104, L. 3 - p. 105, L. 6.) Again, it is apparent that Beavers had the means to 
obtain conventional medicine, but simply preferred to use marijuana. For this 
reason, he failed to present evidence that same objective could have been 
accomplished through less offensive alternatives. 
In addition, at Beavers' second trial, he admitted that he possessed 31 
marijuana plants and the startings for an additional 49 plants. (Tr., vol. Ill, p. 108, 
Ls. 7-17.) Again, this amount of marijuana far exceeds what even the most 
liberal states with medical marijuana laws allow its patients to possess for 
personal medical use. Under no reasonable view does Beavers possession of 
31 marijuana plans and 49 starts constitute "personal use." The district court did 
not err in refusing to permit Beavers to present evidence of his necessity defense 
or in refusing to instruct the jury concerning the defense. 
In fact, the district court specifically found that Beavers failed to present 
reasonable evidence of both the first and third elements of the necessity defense 
test - that Beavers presented no evidence of a specific immediate harm and that 
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he presented no evidence showing that the same objective could not have been 
accomplished by a less offensive alternative. The district court held: 
Well, I mean, I can agree that the defendant, of course, is 
entitled to have his legal theory of defense submitted to the jury by 
an instruction. And as pointed out, medical necessity, in fact, is not 
a recognized defense in the state of Idaho. And I do realize, of 
course, that the defendant has a common law necessity defense 
available to him, as do all defendants. And as indicated by Ms. 
Wick, the necessity defense cannot logically apply to the charge of 
delivery of marijuana or to possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver. 
But with reference to the lesser defense [sic] of simple 
possession, it's my opinion that, based upon the evidence you 
submitted outside the presence of the jury, that there's an absence 
of evidence that the defendant lacked adequate legal medical 
alternatives to the use of marijuana, that there's no reasonable 
evidence of any specific threat of any immediate harm to the 
defendant, that there's no reasonable evidence that the defendant 
could have prevented the threatened harm by any less offensive 
alternative such as the reasonable pursuit of medical attention, 
which I don't find he engaged in. 
Specifically I mean he complained of irritable bowel 
syndrome, depression, anxiety, hypertension, headaches, angina. 
Certainly there's not even any suggestion that he sought 
psychological or psychiatric care and that he pursued, in my 
opinion any - I don't believe he reasonably pursed medical 
attention for the complaints that he has. Certainly had he done so, 
he very well may have been able to receive legally prescribed 
medication for any psychological problem such as depression or 
anxiety or any medical condition that he complained of such as high 
blood pressure. 
There was no reasonable evidence submitted by the 
defense that, based upon the amount seized from the defendant 
and the number of marijuana plants involved and the fact that he 
was actually selling marijuana, that the harm caused by violating 
the law was less than the threatened harm. Certainly it's difficult to 
belief [sic] that he was simply growing for his own use when, at the 
same - if, at the same time as the evidence clearly shows, he was 
selling marijuana. 
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So after having considered all of the evidence submitted by 
the State during the trial as well as the evidence submitted by the 
defendant outside the presence of the jury, its my determination 
that there's no - that, in fact, no reasonable view of the evidence 
would support the giving of the instruction on common law defense 
of necessity. 
(Tr., vol. Ill, p.130, L. 21 - p. 132, L. 21.) 
Beavers failed to present any reasonable evidence as to the first or third 
elements of the necessity defense and, therefore, the district court did not err in 
refusing to permit Beavers to present evidence concerning this defense to the 
jury or in refusing to give Beavers' proffered jury instruction. 
In addition, the state adopts its arguments in J.C. and I.D. supra for its 
argument that necessity can never be a defense to trafficking. Also, the state 
adopts in argument in I.F. supra because, again, the record from the second trial 
is devoid of any causal connection between Beavers marijuana use and his 
purported improved medical condition. 
Because Beavers failed to present evidence that supported elements of 
his necessity defense, the district court did not err when it refused to permit him 
to assert the necessity defense to the jury or when it refused his jury instruction. 
111. 
The District Court Correctly Enhanced Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case 
A. Introduction 
Beavers asserts that his sentences in the Second Case could not be 
enhanced by the prior convictions in his First Case, because those prior 
convictions did not exist at the time that he committed the offenses in the Second 
Case. (Appellant's brief, p. 37.) The district court correctly interpreted the 
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applicable enhancement statute in enhancing Beavers' sentence in the Second 
Case. Further, even if the district court erred in applying the enhancement, such 
error is harmless. 
B. Standard of Review 
The interpretation and application of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 
337,338,971 P.2d 1161, 1162 (Ct. App.1999). 
C. The District Court Correctly Enhanced Beavers' Second Trafficking 
Conviction 
As an initial matter, the state alleged that three distinct enhancements 
applied to Beavers' Second Case. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 586-89.) However, the district 
court only applied one of the sentencing enhancements to Beavers' ultimate 
sentence. The district court found I.C. § 37-2739A inapplicable because Beavers 
was not adequately advised of increased penalties, which increased the 
mandatory minimum sentence to three years and the maximum sentence to life 
imprisonment, when he waived his right to a trial on the enhancement. (Tr., vol. 
I, p. 1068, L. 12 - p. 1072, L. 1.) In addition, the district court did not enhance 
Beavers sentence based upon 1.C. § 37-2739, which uses the permissive 
language "may." Thus, the issue is whether the district court properly applied the 
sentencing enhancement found at I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(7). This statute reads, in 
its entirety: "A second conviction for any trafficking offense as defined in 
subsection (a) of this section shall result in a mandatory minimum fixed term 
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that is twice that otherwise required under this section." I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(7) 
(emphasis added). 
In the Second Case, Beavers was convicted of trafficking in marijuana, 25 
marijuana plants or more but fewer than 50 marijuana plants, in violation of I.C. § 
37-2732B{a)(1 )(A), which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 
imprisonment of one year and a fine of not less than $5000.00. (R., vol. Ill, p. 
655; I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(A).) The maximum sentence for this crime is fifteen 
years and a fine of not more than $50,000.00. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1 )(E). The 
district court, applying I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(7), enhanced the minimum fixed 
sentence from one year to two years and imposed an indeterminate period of ten 
years, for a total sentence of twelve years. (R., vol. 111, p. 681.) 
Beavers asserts that the application of the enhancement was error 
because at the time that "Beavers committed the offenses alleged in the Second 
Case, he had no prior drug convictions." (Appellant's brief, pp. 36-37.) It 
appears that no Idaho court has yet addressed this exact issue. However, his 
argument is contrary to the plain language of the statute, which demands no 
specific sequence, but only requires a prior trafficking conviction before the 
mandatory minimum sentence can be imposed. 
Idaho law clearly establishes that one is convicted, not upon sentencing, 
but upon either a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by a jury after trial. United States 
v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P .3d 1059 (2008). In Sharp, the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted that a conviction is a separate and distinction occurrence from 
punishment and therefore must occur first. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 404, 179 P .3d at 
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1060. The Court specifically rejected the notion that "conviction" means a 
judgment of conviction. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 405, 179 P.3d at 1061. 
Beavers committed his first offenses on August 13, 2006. (R., vol. I, p. 
30.) Beavers committed the second offenses on November 21, 2007. (R., vol. 11, 
pp. 276-77 .) Beavers was convicted of the first offenses on June 19, 2008 upon 
"a finding of guilt by a jury after trial," and was convicted of the second offenses 
on December 30, 2008 upon "a finding of guilt by a jury after trial." (R., vol. 111, 
pp. 562-64; R., vol. Ill, pp. 655-56.) Therefore, Beavers was convicted of the 
felony offense of trafficking in his First Case prior to his conviction of trafficking in 
the Second Case, and is properly subject to the two-year minimum term found in 
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(7). 
Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(7) is similar to the DUI enhancement statute 
located at I.C. § 18-8005(4). In State v. Craig, 117 Idaho 983,793 P.2d 215 
(1990), the Idaho Supreme Court was faced with the similar question of whether 
a second DUI conviction needed to precede a third DUI violation in order for the 
defendant to subject to a felony conviction under the DUI enhancement statute. 
The court concluded that so long as a defendant "'is found guilty of three (3) or 
more violations of the provisions of the [DUI statute] ... within five (5) years,' he 
has committed a felony, regardless of whether the third violation preceded the 
second conviction." Craig, 117 Idaho at 985, 793 P.2d at 217. Likewise, the 
plain language of the trafficking enhancement statute simply applies to a second 
conviction. 
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Beavers compares this enhancement statute to the persistent violator 
statute found at I.C. § 19-2514 and argues that the statute is "based on the idea 
that all such enhancements are designed to punish recidivism." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 38.) This argument fails, however, for three reasons. First, the Court will 
resort to statutory construction only where legislative intent cannot be inferred 
from the plain language of the statute. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 
P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Because, as argued above, the enhancement by 
its plain language applies when there are successive crimes and successive 
convictions, resorting to the policy argument proposed by Beavers is contrary to 
applicable legal standards. 
Second, it is not at all apparent that the legislature's intent was the same 
in relation to the present statute as with the habitual offender statute. I.C. § 37-
37-2732B(a)(7) only enhances the fixed portion for trafficking offenses. In 
contrast, I.C. § 19-2514 enhances any third felony conviction, for crimes ranging 
from murder to insufficient fund checks, to a potential life sentence. Beavers' 
assumption that the legislature wanted to give drug traffickers an opportunity to 
rehabilitate after a conviction before doubling the fixed penalty for multiple 
trafficking offenses, merely because it had done so for general habitual 
offenders, is entirely speculative. On the contrary, the very nature of fixed 
minimum sentences indicates more concern with punishment and prevention 
than with rehabilitation of the trafficker. 
Third, application of the standard that Beavers advocates does not assist 
him. As a general rule, under the persistent violator statute convictions entered 
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the same day or charged in the same information count as a single violation for 
establishing a defendant's persistent violator status, which allows a defendant an 
opportunity to rehabilitate between convictions and assures that the first time 
offender who commits multiples felonies during the same course of events will be 
warned about the persistent violator statute. State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 
344, 715 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337,339, 
971 P.2d 1161, 1163 (Ct. App. 1999). However, "the nature of the convictions in 
any given situation must be examined to make certain that the general rule is 
appropriate." Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344, 715 P.2d at 1014. 
Here, given the nature of Beavers' convictions, the general rule is not 
appropriate. The events giving rise to the charges in the First Case and the 
Second Case were charged independently and were tried separately. Further, 
even if he had not been previously convicted at the time that he committed the 
offenses in the Second Case, Beavers was certainly on notice, after having all of 
his marijuana and related paraphernalia seized after his arrest in the First Case, 
that his conduct was illegal and that the state would prosecute him for this 
conduct. Despite this knowledge, Beavers nonetheless began a new grow 
operation and sold marijuana to a confidential informant. Beavers had the 
opportunity to reform his behavior and to rehabilitate himself between his first 
and second arrest and simply failed to do so. 
Finally, even if the district court erred in applying this enhancement, such 
error was harmless. Generally, an error will be regarded as harmless if the 
appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result 
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would have been reached, regardless of the error. State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337, 
340, 971 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Ct. App. 1999). Here, Beavers would have received 
the same sentence regardless of whether the district court applied the sentencing 
enhancement or not. 
As an initial matter, Beavers' sentence on his second trafficking conviction 
was well within the statutory maximum for trafficking, even if the district court had 
not applied the sentencing enhancement. Further, the fixed portion of his 
sentence on the second trafficking conviction was only two years, which is less 
than the three year minimum fixed sentence on his first trafficking conviction. 
Against the prosecutor's request, the district court ordered all of the sentences 
from both the First Case and the Second Case to run concurrently. (Tr., vol. Ill, 
p. 1053, L. 19- p. 1054, L. 13; p. 1072, Ls. 2-24.) Thus, the enhancement does 
not change Beavers' minimum term of imprisonment. Only the tail portion of his 
second trafficking sentence (which was unaffected by the enhancement) 
lengthened Beavers' exposure to additional prison or parole time. The district 
court explained its reasoning for the lengthier tail on Beavers' second trafficking 
conviction: 
With regard to the outside sentence, if we hadn't had the 
second trafficking case, frankly, the first case I would think that 
three-year mandatory minimum might well overdo the seriousness 
of what was needed because of the circumstances of that first case 
and certainly wouldn't need to go anywhere near the 15 years on 
the first case. 
But I agree with the state. When you are out on, you know, 
a charge for trafficking, and you just keep doing it, it indicates that 
some sort of greater tail or greater indeterminate is needed in the 
second case to point out the consequences here, and you are 
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looking at a long time in prison if you don't take advantage of the 
rehabilitative courses. 
Basically, in terms of the overall goals of sentencing here, I 
feel an overall term of 12 years is probably sufficient to meet the 
goals of sentencing. And I can impose that on the Count Ill in the 
second case, the trafficking case, by imposing the two years fixed, 
then years indeterminate for a total not to exceed 12 years in the 
state penitentiary. That gives the mandatory minimum doubled on 
the Count Ill for trafficking of the two years fix and ten years 
indeterminate, for a total not to exceed 12 years. 
But then we have the second case where you go out and sell 
the stuff to a Cl and regardless of the Cl's view of your motives, 
that is neither here nor there, as far as the Court is concerned. The 
fact is you sold it to a Cl, and that's why I am going to 12 years in 
Count Ill [the trafficking conviction] in the second case, in fact, in 
essence doubling the sentence because its repetitive conduct, and 
the Court - although it is marijuana and all that, so on and so forth, 
there are still serious matters that need to be addressed. 
(Tr., vol. I, p. 1066, L. 7 - p. 1068, L. 4.) It is clear that the district court was not 
relying on the enhancement for the lengthier indeterminate sentence but rather 
on the fact that this was Beavers' second trafficking offense and that it was 
"repetitive conduct." Even without the application of the enhancement, the 
district court would have given Beavers a lengthier sentence in the second case. 
For this reason, even if the district court committed error in applying the 
enhancement, such error was harmless. 
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ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL 
The District Court Erred When. After Withdrawing Beavers' Admission. It Failed 
To Reinstate The Parties To The Status Quo Prior To The Admission Having 
Been Made 
A. Introduction 
In the Second Case, Beavers admitted Part Ill of the Amended 
Information. Part Ill alleged that he had previously committed a trafficking 
offense and, pursuant to I.C. § 37-2739A, that any sentence imposed upon his 
conviction of delivery in the Second Case was to include a mandatory minimum 
fixed term of imprisonment to run consecutively to any other sentence imposed. 
(R., vol. 111, p. 588.) The district court held that Beavers' plea to this 
enhancement was not entered knowingly and, therefore, it would not apply the 
enhancement. (Tr., vol. I, p. 1068, L. 12- p. 1072, L. 1.) Rather than return to 
the parties to the status quo prior to the admission, the district court proceeded to 
sentencing as if the state had never charged the enhancement. By its actions, 
the district court effectively dismissed the enhancement. The district court further 
decided that the sentencing goals could be met without the need for this 
enhancement, and, even it applied the enhancement, it did not need to run the 
enhancement consecutive to Beavers' other sentences. The district court erred 
by dismissing the enhancement. 
8. Standard of Review 
Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in dismissing a criminal 
action is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises free review. 
37 
State v. Bilbao, 130 Idaho 500, 502, 943 P.2d 926, 928 (1997). The state 
asserts that same standard of review applies when a district court de facto 
dismisses a sentencing enhancement by its refusal to apply that enhancement 
and its refusal to allow the state to proceed on its charge. 
C. The District Court Erred When, After Withdrawing Beavers' Admission, It 
Failed To Reinstate The Parties To The Status Quo Prior To The 
Admission Having Been Made 
Beavers never filed a motion to withdraw his admission to the 
enhancement. Rather, at sentencing the district court decided, sua sponte, that 
Beavers did not knowingly admit the enhancement because he was not informed 
of its maximum sentencing consequences and, therefore, it would not apply the 
enhancement. (Tr., vol. I, p. 1069, L. 5- p. 1072, L. 1; R., vol. Ill, p. 707.) For 
purposes of this appeal, the state does not contest that Beavers was not 
adequately informed of the maximum consequences associated with his 
admission to the enhancement. However, the state asserts that the district court 
erred when, after making the finding that Beavers was not adequately informed 
of the sentencing consequences and withdrawing Beavers' plea, it failed to return 
the parties to the status quo prior to the admission being made. Although the 
district court may have had the discretion to withdraw Beavers' plea, it had no 
discretion to simply ignore the charged enhancement and to proceed to 
sentencing as if the enhancement charge did not exist. 
In essence, the district court "deleted" the enhancement and proceeded to 
sentence Beavers as if the state had never charged the enhancement. This 
effectively dismissed Part Ill of the state's Information. A court may dismiss a 
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criminal case only upon providing notice to the parties of its intent to dismiss. 
I.C.R. 48. The district court erred by "deleting" the enhancement and effectively 
dismissing Part Ill of the state's Information without providing notice to the 
parties, particularly to the state. 
When a guilty plea is withdrawn, the proper course of action is to return 
the parties to the status quo. State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 568, 990 P.2d 
144, 149 (Ct. App. 1999) (in dissent). After withdrawing Beavers' guilty plea to 
the charge, the district court was obligated to set the matter for trial on the 
enhancement and to not simply ignore the enhancement. The district court erred 
in failing to failing to return the parties to the status quo. 
In State v. Harrington, Harrington, following a jury trial where he was 
convicted of burglary and malicious injury to property, admitted to being a 
persistent violator. Harrington, 133 Idaho at 564, 990 P.2d at 145. Several 
weeks later, Harrington filed a motion to withdraw his persistent violator 
admission and a hearing was held on the matter. Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565, 
990 P.2d at 146. At the hearing, Harrington presented evidence that the two 
prior convictions to which he had admitted stemmed from a single prosecution 
and he was not, therefore, a persistent violator. & The district court did not 
formally rule on Harrington's motion to withdraw his admission, but did issue an 
order amending its earlier pre-sentence order to reflect its revised treatment of 
Harrington's two prior felonies as one conviction for purposes of sentencing 
enhancement. & The district court then sentenced Harrington and suspended 
the sentences. & The state appealed, asserting that the district court erred in 
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failing to return the parties to the status quo after it determined that Harrington 
was not a persistent violator. Harrington, 133 Idaho at 566,990 P.2d at 147. 
The court of appeals held that any procedural error committed by the court 
was harmless. jg_,_ The court of appeals examined the language of the persistent 
violator statute and held that based on the language that a defendant "be 
sentenced to a term in the custody of the state board of correction which term 
shall be for not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life," that the 
district court was free to suspend Harrington's sentence. Harrington, 133 Idaho 
at 567, 990 P.2d at 148. The court of appeals further found that based on the 
district court's comments at Harrington's sentencing that Harrington would have 
received the same sentence, even assuming that he was found to be a persistent 
violator. J.Q,_ 
Unlike Harrington, the error in this case is not harmless and the district 
court would not have imposed the same sentence if it had applied the 
enhancement. Unlike the persistent violator statute at issue in Harrington, I.C. § 
37-2739A includes the language: "The mandatory minimum period of three (3) 
years incarceration shall not be reduced and shall run consecutively to any 
other sentence imposed by the court." I.C. § 37-2739A (emphasis added). 
The plain language of the statute required Beavers to serve three years 
consecutive to any other sentence imposed by the court. Beavers was 
sentenced to three years fixed in the First Case and to two years fixed on the 
other offenses in the Second Case. The mandatory three year period of 
incarceration in I.C. § 37-2739A doubled Beavers' mandatory period of 
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incarceration. For this reason, Beavers would not have received the same 
sentence whether or not the enhancement was applied, and the district court's 
error was not harmless. 
D. The District Court Erred When It Decided That Sentencing Goals Had 
Been Met And So It Would Not Apply The Enhancement 
The district court also abused its discretion when it determined that, even 
if Beavers' admission had been voluntary, it still would not apply the 
enhancement because it had met the goals of sentencing without regard to the 
enhancement. The district court erred in making this finding. 
The Idaho Constitution provides that "[T]he legislature can provide 
mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence imposed shall 
not be less that the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory 
minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced." Idaho Const. art. V, § 13. 
"A mandatory minimum sentence is not subject to reduction by a district court 
because the sentencing requirements are mandatory." State v. Hansen, 138 
Idaho 791, 797, 69 P.3d 1052, 1058 (2003). Idaho Code § 37-2739A is a 
sentence enhancement statute that requires a mandatory minimum sentence of 
three years fixed. 
At sentencing, the district court stated: "I find the goals of sentencing can 
easily be met without regard to [l.C. § 37-2739A]." (Tr., vol. I, p. 1068, Ls. 15-
16.) The court reiterated this conclusion in its Memorandum and Order Denying 
Rule 35 Motion, which it issued in response to the State's Rule 35 motion to 
correct an illegal sentence: 
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In this very unusual case, imposing the sentence of only two (2) 
years fixed on the Delivery charge did not adversely affect the 
Court's ability to achieve the goals of sentencing under Idaho law 
for all charges in both cases. 
In terms of meeting the goals of sentencing, it was this 
Court's conclusion that the enhanced mandatory minimum of two 
(2) years fixed on the trafficking charge on Count Ill in this case met 
the goals of sentencing for the fixed portion of the sentence 
imposed on each conviction in this case. 
(R., vol. Ill, p. 708.) 
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the 
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. & Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685,688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362,365,913 P.2d 578,581 
(1996). "Ambiguity is not established merely because differing interpretations are 
presented to the Court. Otherwise, all statutes would be considered ambiguous." 
Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362, 79 P .3d at 721. 
The plain language of the statute creates a mandatory minimum sentence. 
Idaho Code § 37-2739A states: 
Any person who is convicted of violating the felony provisions of 
section 37-2732(a), Idaho Code, by distributing controlled 
substances to another person, who is not subject to a fixed 
minimum term under section 37-27398, Idaho Code, and who has 
previously been convicted within the past ten (10) years in a court 
of the United States, any state or a political subdivision of one or 
more felony offenses of dealing, selling or trafficking in controlled 
substances on an occasion or occasions different from the felony 
violation of section 37-2732(a), Idaho Code, and which offense or 
offenses were punishable in such court by imprisonment in excess 
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of one (1) year, shall be sentenced to the custody of the state board 
of correction for a mandatory minimum period of time of not less 
than three (3) years or for such greater period as the court may 
impose up to a maximum of life imprisonment. The mandatory 
minimum period of three (3) years incarceration shall not be 
reduced and shall run consecutively to any other sentence 
imposed by the court. 
I.C. § 37-2739A (emphasis added). 
The district court ignored the plain meaning of this statute. There is no 
ambiguity and the legislative intent is clear from the plain meaning of the words 
of the statute. The minimum term of imprisonment contemplated under this 
statute is three years. I.C. § 37-2739A. Because the application of an 
enhancement is mandatory, the district court did not have the power to simply 
ignore it. On remand, if Beavers is found guilty after trial or admits to the 
enhancement, the state requests that the district court be ordered to follow its 
constitutional duty and apply the enhancement. 
E. The District Court Erred When It Determined That Even If It Applied The 
Enhancement, It Would Not Run Consecutively To Beavers' Other 
Sentences 
Finally, the district court erred when it concluded that even if it applied the 
enhancement, that the enhancement did not need to run consecutive to Beavers' 
other sentences. (R., vol. Ill, pp. 709-11.) The district court held that a three 
year minimum fixed on the delivery conviction in the Second Case, "imposed 
concurrently with the sentences imposed on the other charges for which the 
defendant was sentenced at the sentencing hearing would fully comply with the 
mandate of Section 37-2739A." (R. vol. Ill, p. 711.) The plain language of the 
statute is clear: "The mandatory minimum period of three (3) years incarceration 
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shall not be reduced and shall run consecutively to any other sentence 
imposed by the court." I.C. 37-2739A (emphasis added.) The district court 
was required to impose a minimum three year fixed term of imprisonment upon 
Beavers' conviction of Delivery in the Second Case and was required to run that 
sentence consecutive to all the other sentences imposed in both the First Case 
and Second Case, because all of the sentences were imposed at the same time, 
on the same day, and at the same hearing. At a bare minimum, the enhanced 
sentence must run consecutive to the other sentences imposed in the same case 
(the Second Case). The sentence imposed on delivery conviction in the Second 
Case is therefore illegal and must be corrected in conformity with the 
requirements of I.C. § 37-2739A. 
The mandatory minimum nature of Idaho Code § 37-2739A has been 
addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals which held that a sentencing 
enhancement under that statute requires a "minimum three-year fixed term be 
imposed on a second-time trafficker in drugs." State v. Way, 117 Idaho 594, 
596-97, 790 P.2d 375, 377-78 (Ct. App. 1990). The Court in Way concluded that 
"the minimum three-year term runs consecutive to any other sentence imposed 
at the same time by the court for a felony violation of J.C. § 37-2732(a)." Way, 
117 Idaho at 597, 790 P.2d at 378 (italics in original). Beavers was convicted of 
two other crimes in the Second Case and three crimes in the First Case. These 
other sentences were imposed at the same time as his sentence on the delivery 
charge. Thus, the three year minimum sentence on the delivery charge must run 
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consecutive to the other two sentences in the Second Case and consecutive to 
the sentences in the First Case. The district court erred in ruling otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Mark Beavers' 
convictions. The state further requests that his sentences be vacated and the 
case remanded so that a jury can decide whether LC. § 37-2739A applies. 
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